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Abstract: The source literature shows two trends in research on social consequences of 
religious engagement. On the one hand, researchers argue that religiosity strengthens 
social competence and the mechanisms of communal activity; on the other hand, many 
studies show that religious activity reduces the level of social capital. The study presented 
in this article is an attempt of search for links between religiosity and populist attitudes. 
The concept of populism used in the study refers to an individual’s social functioning and 
their perception of the sphere of politics. The search for the directions of correlation of 
populist attitudes and religiosity was based on an attempt to identify types of people with 
different (but internally homogeneous) relationships between the key variables. We found 
three homogeneous clusters and named them with reference to the elements prevailing in 
each one: religious, moderate, and populist. The analysis showed that religiosity is not a 
moderator of creating populist attitudes in Poland. To the contrary, by co-occurring with 
lower levels of populism, religiosity may serve as a kind of umbrella protecting people from 
populist attitudes. Our analysis supports the views of researchers who argue that 
religiosity is related to the pro-social element. 
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1. The thin ideology of populism 
Populism as a social phenomenon can be explained in various ways, 
both as regards its nature and components and as regards its effects. 
Sometimes, it is defined by researchers as a response to the crisis of 
political representation (Taggart 2004, 272-274) or the introduction of 
policies supported by a larger part by the population but ultimately 
detrimental to the economic interests of that same majority (Dornbush 
and Edwards 1991, 11). It may be described as an ideology (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 16) which opposes the dominant social values and 
whose assumption is that politics should reflect the general will of the 
people (Mudde 2004, 543). Especially recently, populism has been severely 
criticized as the source of anti-democratic tendencies in contemporary 
politics. Jan-Werner Müller (2017, 22) writes about it: “Populism arises 
with the introduction of representative democracy; it is its shadow”, and 
Michael Freeden (2017, 6) even points out: “Populism is often seen as an 
ideology of the dispossessed, and it may indeed recruit them, but it is not 
articulating their political agenda”. Some scholars point to quasi-religious 
connotations of populism, defining it as “a political style that sets ‘sacred’ 
people against two enemies: ‘elites’ and ‘others’.” (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 
180). In our study we adopted the ‘thin-ideological’ concept of populism 
proposed by Ben Stanley (2008, 99), which includes four basic elements: (1) 
it assumes the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: the 
‘people’ and the ‘elite’ (2) it posits an antagonistic relationship between 
these two entities; (3) it gives normative priority to the popular will on the 
basis of the idea of popular sovereignty; (4) it adds a moral dimension to 
the political relationships identified above, valorising ‘the people’ as the 
genuine, authentic subject of politics while denigrating ‘the elite’ (Stanley 
and Cześnik 2019, 67-68). Drawing on Stanley’s findings, Tim Dee-
gan-Krause and Kevin Haughton (2009, 823) identify 6 universal 
components of populism: (1) homogeneity of the people; (2) homogeneity 
of the elite; (3) glorification of the people; (4) denigration of the elite; (5) 
unmediated leadership (as befits the sovereignty of the people); and (6) 
rejection of cooperation or compromise (as befits the friend/enemy 
dichotomy). This approach involves the specificity of populism in Central 
European countries and at the same time highlights the role of the factors 
that may lead to the development of populist attitudes, which is especially 
important in the study of the relationship between religiosity and 
populism in Poland. 
Relationships between religiosity and populist attitudes are 
important for the general form of political processes in Poland and for 
many specific solutions affecting social relations. The former results from 
Poles’ declared high level of religiosity as well as the past and present role 
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of the Catholic Church. Poland is highly homogeneous in social terms, 
especially as regards the national and religious structure. More than 90% 
citizens declare they are Polish and Roman Catholics (Turska-Kawa and 
Wojtasik 2017a, 192). This structure determines both the level and the 
direction of citizens’ political engagement. For example, it has some 
impact on the content of political programs and the major subjects of 
election campaigns (i.a., the issues of compulsory religion lessons at 
school, public rights of people living in partnerships, acceptability of 
euthanasia and abortion etc.). Interestingly, the processes of system 
transformation had some consequences for the Catholic Church in Poland: 
the Polish society opened to the tendencies occurring in Western 
countries, including laicization and secularization (Norris and Inglehart 
2011, 14). This resulted in some cracks in the previously coherent religious 
structure of Polish Catholics, gradually leading to the stratification of 
social and political attitudes (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2017b, 61-67). 
Regarding the role of religion in the processes of social relations 
development, the most important factor seems to be the character of 
Polish religiosity, which has the popular nature and involves the fusion of 
sacred and profane spheres in everyday life. The popular character means 
that it is dominated by non-liturgical elements. Popular religiosity 
involves anything that used to be called paraliturgy in classic theology. In 
other words, popular religiosity means religious feelings and behaviors 
regarding God or saints represented by Christians living in a certain 
culture (Prusowski 2009 184). Popular religiosity, although frequently 
considered to be immature, gives the person something meaningful and 
helps form their identity. In Poland, its fundamental features are the mass 
character (intensity of religious practices) and ceremonial character 
(observance of holidays and customs). Another expression of popular 
religiosity is the fact that it is closely connected with local customs and 
local tradition. It is not individualized but set in a particular community.  
The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between 
religiosity and populist attitudes in Poland. The religious context of 
populism is determined by its specificity, especially in the situation in 
which some populist movements directly refer to religious values (Van 
Kessel 2016, 68), allowing o differentiate between what is “ours and good” 
and “foreign and bad” (Roy 2016, 186). Moreover, some religious 
institutions are able to mobilize the potential of populist movements 
(O’Brien 2015, 344) or even organize such activities themselves (Wysocka 
2008, 65). In the study, religiosity will be defined as the level of religious 
practices and engagement (the frequency of prayers, participation in 
church services or living in accordance with religious rules). Populism will 
be conceptualized on the basis of dimensions of populism identified by 
Stanley and its components proposed by Deegan-Krause and Haughton. 
They were operationalized using two variables: anti-elitism and the primacy 
of people’s will. Anti-elitism involves ordinary people’s antagonistic attitude 
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to elites. In social awareness elites are only attributed particular 
intentions and instrumental use of people for their own interests. The 
primacy of people’s will is understood as the attitude that attributes the 
priority to people’s expectations in conflict with social or state interest. It 
assumes that socially significant choices should be made with 
consideration of social expectations, which differ from the interests of the 
authorities, political elites or international institutions.  Due to the 
specificity of Polish religiosity, the analysis will involve the identification 
of types of people with different relationships between populist attitudes 
and religiosity, which can affect their socio-political functioning.  
 
2. Populism in Poland 
Researchers point out that populism in Central European countries is 
specific in comparison to consolidated democracies (Enyedi 2016, 11-13). It 
results from different historical, cultural and social references. The former 
ones are connected with the period of system transformation and a 
relatively shorter time of institutionalization of democratic processes (as 
compared to Western European countries). Their effect is e.g., the specific 
anti-establishment populism, directed against post-communist political 
elites (Učeň 2007, 58) . In the case of cultural determinants, it is mostly the 
low level of political socialization of the members of the society that were 
born and raised in the authoritarian regime before 1989. Filip Kostelka 
(2014, 952) points to the very role of democratic change in the character of 
political socialization of societies in post-communist countries as 
compared to Western Europe. The specificity of social references involves 
the relative weakness of civic society and the low level of social capital 
(Rupnik 2016, 82). The fact that the civic society (which could canalize 
effectively the protest movements) is poorly established may be a factor 
supporting the generation of populist attitudes and tendencies in the 
society. These factors may contribute to the occurrence of specific sources 
of populism in countries such as Poland, where the classic patterns of 
populism are not relevant. 
The process of actual party institutionalization of populism, 
understood as political parties gaining political relevance as a result of 
exceeding the threshold of parliamentary representation, began with the 
perspective of Poland’s accession to the European Union. Opposing the 
plans of integration was the basic factor of the electoral success of 
Samoobrona [Self-Defence] and Liga Polskich Rodzin [the League of Polish 
Families] (Jasiewicz 2008, 9). These two parties overturned the logic of the 
post-communist division, which determined the genetic sources of 
parliamentary success of political parties in Poland at the end the 20th 
century. Not only did they only obtain parliamentary representation but 
after the next election (2005), they formed the cabinet together with 
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Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) [Law and Justice]. Apart from the subsequent 
early election in 2007, the following elections were successful for populist 
parties. The programs of those parties focused on the problems of social 
progressivism (Ruch Palikota [Palikot Movement] in 2011) or the criticism of 
political establishment (Kukiz’15 in 2015). Although the sources of their 
populism varied, the common characteristic of the parties was 
personalized leadership, reflected i.a., in using the name of the leader in 
the party names.  
Currently, one of the important aspects of populism in Poland is the 
role of religious institutions in creating political competition processes. It 
results from two reasons. The first one is a high level of Poles’ declared 
religiosity and a high level of homogeneity of that religiosity. The other 
reason is determined by political functions of the Catholic Church: since 
the time of communism, it has been influencing politics and political 
parties. But in the 21st century, this involvement became institutionalized 
in the form of media connected with the Redemptorist priest Tadeusz 
Rydzyk. He began his activity with establishing the radio station “Radio 
Maryja”, later supplemented with the TV station “Trwam”, the newspaper 
“Nasz Dziennik” and a higher school. The program of priest Rydzyk’s 
media is a mix of populism directed at excluded social groups, criticism of 
political elites and arousing the sense of community based on strong 
nationalism. He supports particular politicians, from their media 
promotion up to providing support in election campaigns (Wysocka 2009). 
The example of Radio Maryja and the related media shows that the 
religious factor is a significant factor of creating populist tendencies in 
Polish politics with sources in religion.   
 
3. Research model 
On the one hand, researchers prove that religious engagement 
strengthens social and communal competence. The religious factor plays 
an important role in linking religious axiology with social values (Leege 
1993, 13) and in socialization functions of religious institutions (Greenberg 
2000: 386; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001: 756). Research results show that 
religion mobilizes people to engage in social and political activity, 
determining their engagement and ways of its expression (Musick and 
Wilson 2008, 279; Aghazadeh and Mahmoudoghli 2017, 4). In the USA, 
religiosity and regular participation in church services correlated with 
higher indices of voter turnout (Wuthnow 2003, 429), political interests, 
voluntary membership in organizations (Ruiter and DeGraaf 2006, 197), or 
voluntary and charity activity (Greeley 2001, 146; Ruiter and DeGraff 2006, 
202). In addition, active participation in church community contributed to 
the improvement of individual social competence, communication and 
organizational skills (Putnam and Campbell 2012, 137). A Canadian study, 
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proves stronger relations between religiosity and regular participation in 
church services and activity in voluntary organizations, charity work and 
voluntary work (Reed and Selbee 2000, 582; Bowen 2004, 71). In Poland 
research carried out as part of the General Polish Electoral Study quite 
consistently shows positive relationships between participation in 
religious practices and the likelihood of taking part in elections (Cześnik 
2009, 26).  
The opposite view stresses the possibility that religious activity may 
reduce the level of social openness (Wuthenow 1999, 339), the competitive 
character of citizens’ trust in their own religious group at the expense of 
general social capital (Daniels and der Ruhr 2010, 174; Storm 2014, 16), or 
even the fact that religious activity lowers citizens’ knowledge and social 
competence (Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003, 315). Two kinds of 
relationship can be identified within the demobilization role of religion 
for social participation (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2014: 16). First, the 
sphere of religion will always be competitive to social activity, including 
political activity, and as a result, it will shift religious individuals’ interest 
towards religious issues. This will happen because of a limited amount of 
resources the citizens can allocate to their activity, and engagement in the 
life of the Church will reduce the possibility of activity on other planes of 
social activity (Wuthnow 2003, 419). In addition, high trust in religious 
institutions may lower trust in other institutions, and thus also the 
general social capital (Putnam and Campbell 2012, 118). The other 
direction of the analysis refers to the level of individuals’ religious 
engagement, on its basis formulating conclusions about a negative 
influence of extreme engagement on social participation. On the one hand, 
this results from the relationship between extreme religious engagement 
and the frequency of participating in religious rites, and on the other 
hand, from the negative influence of membership in Church institutions 
on engaging in secular institutions activity (Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 
2003: 318-319). Dietram A. Scheufele, Matthew C. Nisbet and Dominique 
Brossard (Ibidem: 319) point out that strong religious engagement co-
occurs with lower political competence and sense of efficacy in this area.   
Research also shows that religiosity may generate contradictory 
attitudes at the same time. On the one hand, it generates pro-social 
attitudes (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 59; Preston, Salomon and Ritter 
2013, 164), mainly directed at the members of one’s own religious group 
and aggressive towards “outgroups”, especially those that really or 
symbolically threaten religious and moral values (Batson, Floyd, Meyer 
and Winner 1999, 451). At the same time, some data demonstrates that in 
the case of negative attitudes towards out groups religion can be a factor 
preventing actual aggression by referring to values such as e.g., the need 
of self-control regarding negative emotions or impulsive acts (McCullough 
and Willoughby 2009, 78).  
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Paris Aslanidis (2018, 5) points to religion (beside skin pigment, 
language, ethnicity and sex) as a visible social marker that can grow into a 
politically relevant social identity. Being so vivid, such an identity may 
become an easier object of political mobilization and coexist with populist 
attitudes.  Taking into consideration the above-mentioned directions of 
studies on the influence of religiosity on individuals’ social and political 
attitudes described in literature, the authors intend to verify the 
relationships between religiosity and the potential of political populism in 
Poland. We may conjecture that, on the one hand, the level of religiosity 
can be a factor that prevents the development of populist attitudes in the 
political sphere by strengthening social bonds, stability of values and 
stabilization of party identification. What is more, the engagement and 
interest in the public sphere displayed by people with a high level of 
religiosity, which have been diagnosed in different studies, may generate 
the desire to search for information and prevent one from accepting 
simple messages. The other potential viewpoint stresses the possibility of 
reducing the level of broadly understood social openness by religious 
engagement. This means that religion can strengthen populist attitudes 
based on individual’s weakness and close-minded attitude. Then, 
individual political identities can have a labile character and lead to the 
instability of both party entities and the whole party system. One of the 
political consequences of this situation can be greater attractiveness of 
populism as a factor determining political engagement. If both views are 
probable, it is an interesting research task to show the context factors that 
may contribute to the inclusive or exclusive character of religion's 
influence.   
The aim of the presented study is to identify types of people with 
different relationships between religiosity and populist attitudes. We are 
interested in the schemes of correlation of religiosity and populist 
attitudes, the direction and strength of these relationships. Consequently, 
we want to indirectly find the answer to the question whether religiosity 
is a factor that tends to rationalize and protect from populism or whether 
it is just the opposite: the religiosity declared by Poles is a factor that 
stimulates populist attitudes.  
 
4. Methods 
The study was carried out between December 2018 and February 2019 
as part of a nationwide research project “Political Preferences: Attitudes, 
Identifications, Behaviors”. The nationwide sample was selected using 
quota stratified sampling. Distinct strata were voivodeships (N=16), and 
quota control referred to variables such as sex, age and place of residence 
(town or village). The research team was made up of 16 trained 
coordinators of voivodeship studies, who were responsible for executing 
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the study in their region. The survey questionnaire method was used in 
the research. 
The sample included 950 persons: 501 (52.7%) women and 449 (47.3%) 
men. The youngest people (up to 24 years of age) were the smallest group 
(N=103; 10.8%), whereas the largest group (N=191; 20.1%) was made up of 
the oldest respondents, 65+. The other age groups were, respectively: 25-
34 (N=179; 18.8%), 35-44 (N=178; 18.7%), 45-54 (N=148; 15.6%) and 55-64 
(N=151; 15.9%). 361 participants were rural residents 38.0%). Regarding 
towns, the groups included: towns up to 20 thousand residents (N=100; 
10.5%), 20-100 thousand residents (N=168; 17.7%), 100-200 thousand 
residents (N=121; 12.7%) and more than 200 thousand residents (N=200; 
21.1%). 
The research model involves three variables. The first one is 
religiosity. The respondents were asked to express their opinions on four 
statements making the indicator: the regularity of participation in 
religious practices, the depth of faith, the frequency of prayer, and the 
observance of religious rules. They could use a five-point cafeteria of 
responses (definitely not, rather not, hard to say, rather yes, definitely 
yes). The reliability of the scale determined with Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was 0.76. The other two variables – indicators of populist 
attitudes – were conceptualized on the basis of the theoretical model by 
Ben Stanley. Anti-elitism was based on four statements: perceiving politics 
as an instrument of dominance of a minority over the majority, the desire 
of power as the basic motivation of engaging in politics, the possibility of 
revoking all politicians elected in universal elections through the recall 
procedure, and the declared level of trust in the most important 
politicians. The reliability of the scale was 0.67.  The primacy of people’s will 
was diagnosed on the basis of respondents’ opinions on five statements: 
acceptability of making compromises with people with different views, 
supporting broad public constitutions and the binding character of their 
results, justification of politicians’ mediation in political decision-making, 
the attitude to a referendum as a collective way of decision-making, and 
the necessity to make any changes to the constitution by way of 
referendum. The reliability of the scale was 0.73. In the case of statements 
expressing populism, the respondents could also use a five-point cafeteria 
(I strongly disagree, I disagree, hard to say, I agree, I strongly agree). 
5. Results 
In the first stage, we applied the exploratory procedure of two-step 
grouping, whose aim was to identify natural clusters based on the three 
analyzed variables. The analysis produced three internally homogeneous 
clusters, gathering 334, 380 and 236 observations, respectively. The values 
of the analyzed variables converted into standard ten scale in each cluster 
are shown in table. 
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Table 1. Standard ten values of the identified clusters. 
 1st cluster  2nd cluster   3rd cluster  
Religiosity 7.5 4.3 4.8 
Primacy of people’s 
will 
5.0 4.6 7.6 
Anti-elitism 5.3 4.3 7.7 
 
Then, we carried out qualitative analysis of cluster content with 
reference to individual variables, which allowed to attribute relevant 
names to each group of people. The first cluster gathers individuals with 
higher than average level of religiosity and mean values of anti-elitism and 
the primacy of people’s will. These are people who display high indices of 
religious engagement, both in the sphere of regular religious practices 
(including prayer) and internal faith or living in accordance with the rules 
proposed by the religion. In addition, they manifest moderate populist 
tendencies in their attitudes. Due to the dominant factor, this group was 
called religious.  
 
Chart 1. Distribution of religiosity of people from cluster 1 (religious). 
 
 
The second cluster gathers people with average levels of all variables: 
religiosity, primacy of people’s will and anti-elitism. The level of the studied 
variables in this group is slightly below the average, not indicating the 
direction of the relationship between the average level of religiosity with 
variables referring to the level of populism. Neither the religious factor 
nor the populist factor is a significant point of reference for them in 
defining social reality. The lack of a clear factor allows us to call this group 
moderate. 
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Chart 2. Distribution of religiosity of people from cluster 2 (moderate). 
 
The third cluster includes people with an average level of religiosity 
and higher than average values of anti-elitism and the primacy of people’s 
will. This cluster represents people with the most populist attitudes, opting 
for the primacy of the community and against the hierarchical model of 
the social structure. Reference to two clear factors results in the name 
populist.  
 
Chart 3. Distribution of religiosity of individuals from cluster 3 (populist). 
 
The three identified types differ significantly in terms of socio-
demographic variables: sex (H = 11.423; df = 2; p = 0.003), education level (H 
= 67.581; df = 2; p <0.001), age (H = 23.549; df = 2; p < 0.001), place of 
residence (H = 24.782; df = 2; p < 0.001) and financial standing ((H = 23.450; 
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df = 2; p < 0.001). Cluster 1 includes significantly more women than cluster 
2 (U=55,520; p=0.001) and 3 (U=36,019; p=0.04). The second cluster includes 
more people with a higher level of education than cluster 1 (U=52,786; 
p<0.001) and 3 (U=28,493; p<0.001). Cluster 1 includes significantly more 
elderly people than cluster 2 (U=50,543; p<0.001) and 3 (U=33,663; p=0.003). 
Cluster 2 includes more people from bigger towns that cluster 1 (U=50,284; 
p<0.001) and 3 (U=39,666; p=0.013). Better financial standing is declared by 
people representing type 2 than type 3 (U=36,886; p<0.001) and 1 
(U=52,989; p<0.001). 
  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
On the basis of source literature and previous studies, we made the 
thesis that there are some relationships between populism and religiosity. 
The search for the directions of correlation of populism and religiosity was 
based on an attempt to identify types of people with different (but 
internally homogeneous) relationships between the variables. During the 
research procedure, we identified three coherent clusters: religious, 
moderate, and populist. They were given names referring to the dominant 
level of the analyzed variables. The religious ones have a higher than 
average level of religiosity and moderate levels of populism. The moderate 
ones display average values of all the variables. The populist ones have 
higher than average levels of populism and an average level of religiosity.  
The presented cluster analysis shows that religiosity is not a factor of 
creating populist attitudes in Poland. In the group of people with the 
highest declared religiosity we did not find a tendency for the correlation 
of components characteristic of populist political attitudes. This means 
that religious people significantly less often display the tendency to 
antagonize the relationships between ordinary people and elites. They do 
not attribute particular interests to the latter group. Besides, they do not 
manifest a clear priority of the needs of average people versus the views of 
social and political elites. Actually, the presented study suggests an 
opposite tendency: religiosity coexisting with lower levels of populism 
may serve as a kind of umbrella protecting from populist attitudes. Our 
analysis will rather support the views of those researchers who argue that 
religiosity is connected with prosocial attitudes, behaviors oriented at the 
good of other people, or values and emotions that promote such behaviors 
(e.g., Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 61; Preston, Salomon and Ritter 2013, 
175).   
Socio-demographic references of the identified types are interesting. 
Among the religious ones, women and elderly people prevail. They are also 
more often the inhabitants of villages or small towns than big 
agglomerations. Such characteristics of the religious group agree with the 
previous findings in this regard. This may result from the generally longer 
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lifespan of women in Poland and their greater declared religiosity and 
more frequent participation in religious practices. This finding may also 
have its source in the sector influence of secularization tendencies, which 
have a greater impact on people who are less educated and live out of big 
cities.  
 The moderate ones display significantly highest level of education, 
live in bigger towns and have better financial standing. These 
characteristics refer to people with higher ambitions, focusing on the 
achievement of their own life goals and thus being less exposed to the 
sphere of politics. The lack of stronger political stimulation may lead to 
them displaying average values of both, the components of religiosity and 
the populist attitude. The former ones may be connected with stronger 
influence of secularization processes than in the group of religious ones, 
corresponding to residing in bigger towns and higher level of education. 
Average values of components of the populist attitude may be connected 
with the relatively higher income level. In that situation, individuals do 
not have the strong need of political redistribution of income, associated 
with populist postulates to transfer income from the rich to the poor. 
The populist ones are people with lower levels of education, more 
often middle-aged, with medium income. In comparison to the group of 
moderate ones (who have similar values of religiosity), this may indicate 
that the determinants creating populist attitudes are socio-economic 
factors, not religiosity. Better education and higher income seem to 
protect people from populist attitudes. This conclusion is justified because 
it agrees with the observed tendencies of supporting politicians and 
populist movements by people who have lower material resources and 
civic competence. In this approach, populism is a mechanism of 
generating demands by people it represents (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 
183). 
The obtained results may also be explained by the relationship 
between religiosity and the form of Polish party system, in which the two 
dominant political parties, PiS and Platforma Obywatelska (PO) [Civic 
Platform], refer to Christian values while being mainstream parties, not 
based on populist catchphrases. This division makes a special type of 
common ground: an agonistic common ground (Stavrakakis 2018, 49). 
Within it, there exist functional divisions, canalizing radical and populist 
political movements in democratic processes. In the latest parliamentary 
election, PO and PiS generated a total of over 2/3 support, which shows a 
high level of voters’ concentration on parties referring to the traditional, 
conservative values. This strong party polarization is a barrier for radical 
parties, for which it is hard to force their postulates and gain social 
support.  It may also be a shield protecting Polish politics from populist 
movements. Both parties fall into the category of classical 
Christian/democratic formations from the right side of the left-right 
continuum. Significant differences between them occur in terms of 
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economic postulates: PO is a free market party, while PiS postulates a 
more redistributive role of the state. Only this latter element can justify 
analyzing a part of the political program of PiS in categories of populist 
references. The respect for the basic principles of the social teaching of 
the Catholic Church, declared by the two biggest political parties, may 
satisfy the social need of exposing religious values in the sphere of politics 
displayed by at least some supporters of both parties. This factor may also 
reduce the citizens’ need to engage in populist movements. 
Another religious factor that may protect Polish politics from 
populism is the popular character of Polish religiosity. The concept of 
popular religiosity refers to the occurrence of its two zones: central and 
subsidiary. The former includes religious traditions, symbols, values, and 
beliefs. Subsidiary zone is connected with popular religiosity. It is made up 
of beliefs which people use to make their lives meaningful (Lippy 1994, 10).  
The popular character of religion also involves celebrating religiosity 
through participation in collective practices being a manifestation of their 
faith and generating the sense of community with other people who refer 
to similar values (Sutcliffe 2013, 20). Thanks to this type of religiosity, 
people can gain the meaning of their lives but also explain their individual 
significance through the prism of collective interest of their fellow 
believers. The described mechanism can protect one from exposing 
extremism and radicalism, especially if their basis is postulates opposite to 
the principles of the practiced religion and if it required individuals to 
manifest this opposite attitude publicly. The latter reference may refer to 
the concept of competition of activity resulting from the expressions of 
practicing religion and other social activities. The moderation function of 
religious practices also plays a role, as other kinds of engagement are 
evaluated from the perspective of those practices. Popular religiosity 
provides the individual a kind of cognitive background, allowing to 
combine the upheld religious rules with the current sphere of politics. Yet, 
to do so, they must be at least partially coincident. Populism, which 
usually contests the traditional rules and the developed values, will not be 
attractive for religious people either cognitively or socially. Thus, the 
strong roots of Christianity in the Polish society and its influence on the 
sphere of political choices of religiously professed people may explain why 
religiosity protects from populism.   
Another factor connected with religiosity that can lead to the 
reduction of populist perspectives in Polish politics is the Catholic Church 
functioning in the institutional format, which assumes a close hierarchy of 
the structure. Believers who are religiously socialized within such a 
structure form their attitude on the basis of observing the principles of 
their religion and their priests (Nooney and Woodrum 2002, 361-363). 
Thus, they can use the acquired patterns of social activity in their political 
attributions and choices. Populism as a political attitude is at least 
partially based on resistance to someone or something, and the vast 
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majority of religious Poles are Catholics. Both in religious rules and in the 
ways of action, the Catholic Church refers to dialogue, compromise and 
creating non-confrontational attitudes. Therefore, it is more difficult for 
people with higher religiosity level to engage in activities that are 
contrary to their attitude in the religious sphere. They may prefer to use 
the patterns associated with religious engagement, and these support 
community attitudes and activities oriented at the common good. 
Obviously, populist postulates can also stress community, but their 
confrontational character will contradict the Christian search for 
solutions based on compromise.   
Significantly, in the presented study religiosity was not only 
approached as participation in religious services. Instead, we tried to refer 
to individuals’ real spiritual engagement, which cannot be externally 
evaluated: the frequency of prayers or living in accordance with the 
upheld religious values. It is important for our interpretation, because 
religiosity understood this way is similar in character to the described 
components of the populist attitude. The latter is defined, not on the basis 
of the individual’s self-declaration of political attitude, but as a set of 
views and beliefs, just like in the case of our approach to religiosity. This 
means that both studied phenomena are coherent and the analyses and 
conclusions can be applied. Whereas the cited literature proves the 
relationship between the Catholic Church and populist movements in 
Poland (Wysocka 2009; Stanley and Cześnik 2018, 82), so far there have 
been no studies to explore the relationships between religiosity as a social 
attitude and populist attitudes of Poles. Our findings allow us to create a 
dichotomous model of the relationship between religion and populism as a 
social attitude in Poland. In one approach, the most important is the 
relationship between the institutional dimension of religion and populist 
political movements. In the other one, the individualized dimension of 
religion in the form of religiosity prevents the creation of populist 
attitudes.  
  
Annex:  
 Quantitative and percentage-wise distribution of respondents' sociodemographic 
characteristics 
 1 cluster 2 cluster 3 cluster 
 number percent number percent number percent 
Sex 
Woman 200 59.9 180 47.4 121 51.3 
Male 134 40.1 200 52.6 115 48.7 
Education 
no education 3 .9 5 1.3 6 2.6 
elementary/lower 
secondary 
18 5.4 4 1.1 19 8.1 
vocational 48 14.4 23 6.1 56 23.7 
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secondary/post-
secondary 
131 39.2 150 39.5 94 39.8 
higher 134 40.1 198 52.1 61 25.8 
Age 
18-24. 28 8.4 58 15.3 17 7.2 
25-34. 49 14.7 68 17.9 62 26.3 
35-44. 51 15.3 81 21.3 46 19.5 
45-54. 58 17.4 60 15.8 30 12.7 
55-64. 58 17.4 57 15.0 36 15.3 
over 65 90 26.9 56 14.7 45 19.1 
Place of residence 
village 153 45.8 113 29.7 95 40.3 
town up to 20 
thousand residents 
42 12.6 38 10.0 20 8.5 
town 20-100 
thousand residents 
49 14.7 78 20.5 41 17.4 
town 100-200 
thousand residents 
38 11.4 50 13.2 33 14.0 
town over 200 
thousand residents 
52 15.6 101 26.6 47 19.9 
Financial standing 
I’m very poor – I 
don’t have enough 
money even to 
satisfy my basic 
needs 
4 1.2 2 .5 6 2.5 
I live frugally – I 
need to be very 
careful with money 
every day 
42 12.6 24 6.3 36 15.3 
I’m medium wealthy 
– I have enough to 
satisfy my basic 
needs but I have to 
save for more 
expensive purchases 
176 52.7 174 45.8 112 47.5 
I live comfortably – I 
can afford a lot 
without saving for it 
93 27.8 150 39.5 69 29.2 
I live very 
comfortably – I can 
buy whatever I want 
19 5.7 30 7.9 13 5.5 
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